Economic Doctrines and Approaches to Climate Change Policy by Atkinson, Robert D. & Hackler, Darrene
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Economic Doctrines and Approaches to
Climate Change Policy
Robert D. Atkinson and Darrene Hackler
Information Technology and Innovation Foundation
October 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29718/
MPRA Paper No. 29718, posted 20 March 2011 06:32 UTC
  
  
PAGE 1 
Economic Doctrines and 
Approaches to Climate Change 
Policy 
BY ROBERT D. ATKINSON AND DARRENE HACKLER   |   OCTOBER 2010 
 
Climate change is one of the defining issues of our time, and it presents 
fundamental choices between current behaviors and stewardship of future 
resources. Yet, in spite of the importance of getting the policy response 
right, there is intense debate over different solutions, even among those 
who acknowledge that climate change is real and is human made. Until 
recently, the prevailing policy proposal was cap and trade, but other 
solutions have also been proposed, including: carbon taxes; direct emission 
regulations; subsidies or regulatory requirements for existing renewable 
energy; and support for clean energy innovation. The lack of consensus on 
the right approach to climate change stems from a variety of issues 
including debate over causal factors of climate change and the contention 
of affected interests; however, a lack of consensus on the underlying 
approaches (or doctrines) that should guide economic policy broadly plays 
a key role in the debate. 
Ultimately, climate change is an environmental phenomenon with serious economic 
implications; thus, proposed polices seek to reshape economic activity. Yet, the solutions to 
climate change and its economic impact are so varied and complex that it is difficult to 
come up with the “empirically correct” solution.  As a result, advocates and policymakers 
rely on economic “world views” or doctrines to guide their policy deliberations, and the 
resulting policy approaches are a function of these competing doctrines. Favored climate 
change policies reflect the principles of economic doctrines that suggest how economies 
work and, with respect to climate change, how environmental problems arise and possible 
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solutions. Recognizing that approaches to mitigating global climate change emanate from 
well-defined schools of economic thought that have emerged through the lens of political 
discourse should help policymakers better understand the fundamental choices involved in 
addressing the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and hopefully lead to the 
development of more effective policy responses.  
This report explains in detail how four competing economic doctrines interact with and 
support political ideologies present in the climate change policy debate and proposed 
solutions. Different actors in the policy debate (advocates, government officials, the media, 
and legislators) all subscribe, knowingly or not, to an economic doctrine. Currently, in the 
United States, they most likely hold one of the following three doctrines: conservative 
neoclassical, liberal neoclassical, and neo-Keynesian economics, which are all grounded 
more in the 20th century than the 21st. However, supporters of an emerging economic 
doctrine “innovation economics,” – an approach grounded in the growth economists that 
first came to political attention in the 1980’s – not only offer a critique of the others’ 
fundamental views of the economy and climate change, but also articulate an alternative 
approach to climate change policy. The four doctrines form the current political and 
economic landscape of climate change proposals.  
Each of the four doctrines competes for the attention and allegiance of U.S. policymakers. 
The issue of how best to address climate change provides a perfect example of how the 
prevailing doctrines are driving less-than-optimal policy solutions and discourse. Even 
though the doctrines are not precise analogues of climate change positions, they do serve as 
broad frames of reference for climate policy proposals.  
Holders of the neoclassical economics doctrine see climate change as a relatively 
straightforward problem attributable to a simple error of not charging emitters of 
greenhouse gases (GHG) for the full costs of their emissions. However, policymakers 
informed by conservative neoclassical economists, such as Greg Mankiw, a former chair of 
the Council of Economic Advisors under former President George W. Bush, are more 
likely to favor a simple carbon tax, while liberal neoclassicalists favor cap and trade as a way 
to set a price on carbon as Lawrence Summers, Director of the National Economic Council 
and Assistant to President Obama for Economic Policy, has suggested. Both believe that 
once the price is right, the market will respond appropriately and develop the needed 
technologies. In contrast, those informed by neo-Keynesian perspectives favor a more direct 
response such as setting a limit on GHG emissions through emission caps and renewable 
energy portfolio standards, and subsidizing current generators of renewable energy. 
Environmentalists like James G. Speth, an environmental lawyer and founder of the World 
Resources Institute, seem to prefer this approach. Finally, holders of the innovation 
economics doctrine argue that price signals alone are insufficient to drive clean energy 
transformation and that carbon taxes that explicitly support clean energy innovation 
policies to spur research, development, and deployment of next generation alternatives are 
the preferable solution. 
This report provides an overview of these economic doctrines, and then describes how 
current climate change proposals reflect the principles and goals of each doctrine. It offers a 
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critique of the advantages and limitations of each doctrine’s approach to addressing the 
challenge of climate change. It concludes by arguing that an approach to climate change 
policy grounded in innovation economics and in prioritizing clean energy innovation 
promises the most effective path to solving global climate change. 
Economic Doctrines in Policy Competition 
The role of economic doctrines in the public policy process is pervasive, involving far more 
than economists generating economic reports and forecasts. The derivations of economic 
doctrines are steeped in philosophies concerning the essential factors of a stable and 
growing economy and what types of policy interventions, if any, are appropriate to 
promote economic growth. Economic world views as adopted in the political marketplace 
are like political ideologies; and everyone, not just economists in government agencies, 
Congressional committees, and think tanks, possesses basic beliefs that economic doctrines 
instruct. The doctrines guide their thinking and deliberations and help them make sense of 
a complex and rapidly changing economy. This article is focused on the economic thinking 
that has come to the forefront in the political debate around climate change policy, not on 
economics as economists would necessarily describe it. 
Today, Washington policymakers rely on, and implicitly or even sometimes explicitly 
embrace, three prevailing, 20th century economic doctrines: (1) conservative neoclassical 
(sometimes called “supply-side”); (2) liberal neoclassical (sometimes called “Rubinomics,” 
referring to the policies of President Bill Clinton’s Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin); 
and (3) neo-Keynesian, a modified Keynesian response to neoclassical economics. 
Economic doctrines don’t emerge and become adopted on the basis of scholarly arguments 
alone. Rather, the reverse is often the case—the political direction emerges, and inspires a 
range of available and justifying economic ideas. The economic and social structures of an 
era also profoundly shape what economic doctrines emerge into political discourse and 
which policies are effective. The reaction against pure Keynesian economics, as a result of 
1970s stagflation, was especially notable among conservatives. In response, they crafted a 
neoclassical alternative to Keynesian economics known as “supply-side economics,” which 
remains the dominant economic paradigm for many conservatives to this day.1
In the last two decades, however, a small but growing share of economists have argued that 
the dominant doctrines were failing to address critical and complex economic dynamics, 
especially with respect to technological change and innovation. Recognizing fundamental 
limitations in prevailing doctrines, a number of economists proposed a new economic 
doctrine, referred to here as innovation economics. Among other things, it seeks to explain 
the anomalies that the prevailing doctrines prefer to ignore.2 
 More 
politically moderate neoclassical economists embrace many of the same principles as 
supply-siders but have developed a neoclassical economic doctrine that incorporates their 
own belief in a stronger role of government and greater economic equity. Meanwhile, a 
group of neo-Keynesian economists on the left offer ideas that they hope are better able to 
explain current economic events than the original Keynesian doctrine developed after the 
Great Depression.  
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The influence that economics has on policy development in the United States is rooted in 
the discipline’s evolution from the political economy insights of Adam Smith into formal 
mathematical models that are currently the primary manner in which economic knowledge 
is conveyed, particularly for neoclassical economics. Simplifying all economic interactions 
into mathematical models fails to capture much of the real world in terms of complexity, 
uncertainty, and risk that accompanies most interactions. As computers have enabled 
greater mathematical rigor, economic models have attempted to capture more behavioral 
and complex issues—climate change, for example. However, even these successes do not 
allow those with little economics training to fully appreciate how basic assumptions affect 
outcomes. Consequently, economists are set apart, revered and feared in most policy 
discussions because of the prevailing belief that if the numbers say it, it must be so.  
Neoclassical Economics 
Nowhere is economics’ influence on public policy more prevalent than in neoclassical 
economics. As introduced above, two strains of neoclassical thought exist, based mainly on 
political ideology, with conservative and liberal camps. Both embrace several basic 
principles that guide, and we believe, restrict policymakers from fully addressing climate 
change. In particular, neoclassical economists believe that setting a price on carbon—
through a carbon tax or cap and trade—is the principal and often sole policy response 
needed to address climate change. Below we briefly explain the basic principles before 
turning to how these are absorbed into conservative and liberal neoclassical approaches to 
climate change.3 
One of the primary principles of neoclassical economics relevant to the issue of climate 
change is that economic growth is achieved by maximizing allocative efficiency. Society 
receives the greatest net benefit when the distribution of available resources results in a 
desired quantity of goods. This occurs not only because the most efficient allocation of 
resources results in the maximized net benefit through their use, but also because the prices 
consumers are willing to pay for the produced goods equal the marginal costs of 
production.  That is, supply equals demand across all markets in the economy. From the 
standpoint of a neoclassical economist, it would be a violation of this principle to propose a 
policy that would alter the “natural” allocation of factors like capital, labor, and goods and 
services. Regulations, taxes, market power, or other “distortions” will not maximize 
allocative efficiency because the resulting market-price signals do not reflect the free choices 
of individuals and firms. The subsequent loss of allocative efficiency is, in their words, a 
“deadweight loss” that decreases both producer and consumer surplus in market 
transactions. On this principle, both supply-siders and liberal neoclassicalists agree: any 
government intervention or policy that distorts allocative efficiency will harm economic 
growth. 
The neoclassical focus on market transactions that maximize allocative efficiency is based 
on several other principles. One is that the economy is built upon the interaction of firms 
and consumers in markets determined by price signals. Indeed, allocative efficiency 
revolves around the responsiveness of economic agents to price signals. Consequently, 
neoclassical economists emphasize “price mechanisms” like interest rates, currency values, 
inflation, and other monetary factors that determine the value of capital and labor more 
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than institutional factors such as the rate by which firms are developing and adopting new 
technologies. The dominant focus on price signals also explains why formal mathematical 
models have become the language of neoclassical economics, while less quantifiable factors 
such as economic history, culture, norms, and institutions are in the periphery.  
The belief that supply normally meets demand is another neoclassical principle. In this 
paradigm, the economy is simply a large market of goods and services that is generally in 
equilibrium and usually best left to itself. Equilibrium occurs when a market price is 
established through competition such that the amount of goods or services sought by 
buyers is equal to the amount of goods or services produced by sellers. Because the 
economy tends toward equilibrium in the neoclassical view, the main task of economic 
policy is simply to reduce artificial barriers and impediments to market equilibrium, 
particularly by ensuring that prices are aligned with marginal costs.  
A final relevant principle of neoclassical economics is that individuals act in response to 
incentives to rationally maximize their own self-interest, and that the collective pursuit 
of individual self-interest will also maximize public interest. According to Adam Smith, the 
individual who “intends only his own gain” will, in the course of maximizing his needs, be 
“led by an invisible hand to promote...the public interest.” Although this generally may be 
true, new research in behavioral economics is showing that it is not always the case.  
Although conservative and liberal neoclassicalists agree on many key economic principles, 
they differ in some important ways. In general, conservative neoclassicalists view markets as 
less prone to failures, a compelling case for limited government intervention. Liberal 
neoclassicalists, however, consider market failures to be more common, but still generally 
limited. They are more willing to advise government intervention in the economy in the 
cases of the following market failures: 
1. Public good provision, where the market doesn’t produce enough of the desired good 
on its own, such as roads; 
2. Externality, where market agents do not enjoy all of the benefits or incur all of the 
costs of their actions, as with the negative externality of GHG emissions, a by-product 
of a process whereby emitters do not bear the complete costs of emissions;  
3. Information asymmetry, where inefficiencies arise because information about a good’s 
attributes as distributed between a buyer and seller or the attributes of an externality 
between the generator of the externality and an affected party lead to issues like adverse 
selection and moral hazard; and  
4. Economies of scale, where the unit costs of an activity continue to fall as the scale of 
the activity increases, which can result in barriers to potential new market entrants and 
allocative- or X-inefficiencies like cost, operating, productive, and technical 
inefficiencies. 
Beyond these market failures, liberal neoclassicalists are more likely to be willing to support 
intervention in the pursuit of greater economic equity and fairness, a market consequence 
that conservative neoclassicalists generally do not seek to correct through government 
action. Consequently, liberal neoclassicalists are more likely to recognize the limitations of 
a free competitive market and will take steps to address distributional effects. 
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Neo-Keynesian Economics 
The British economist John Maynard Keynes and his followers greatly influenced 
economic attitudes in the three decades after World War II. But during the economic 
stagflation of the mid-1970s, neoclassical conservatives and many moderates “overthrew” 
the Keynesian mantle, reacting to Keynesian doctrine that seemingly failed to address the 
economic crises of the time. Many liberals countered by adapting the principles of 
Keynesianism to incorporate the new global, dynamic, and technology-driven economy. 
This “neo-Keynesian” doctrine—generally held by individuals on the liberal side of the 
economic spectrum—maintains that economic growth is a result of business 
investment, government spending, and consumer spending because of the demand 
for goods and services it produces. This key principle shapes neo-Keynesian economic 
policies as they tend to focus on increasing government spending, with the belief that such 
investment will lead to increased aggregate consumer demand.  
With their focus on demand-led economic growth, neo-Keynesians give little attention to 
the “supply-side” of the economy, or the factors that directly influence what producers do. 
In a neo-Keynesian’s view, policies, such as costly regulations, that might negatively impact 
the supply-side have little effect on overall economic growth. For this reason, they are more 
willing to support direct government regulation of economic activity. According to neo-
Keynesians, if companies think consumer demand is increasing, they will have an incentive 
to invest more; they contend that government can do little to directly spur more growth, 
other than ensure high levels of aggregate demand. 
Neo-Keynesian doctrine also posits that economic policies are designed to maximize not 
efficiency, but social welfare, defined as a more equitable distribution of wealth and the 
achievement of social policy objectives (such as a clean environment, small business 
growth, etc.). Neo-Keynesians argue that outcomes in a market-based economy are more 
sustainable if there is an equitable distribution of wealth. Neo-Keynesians see most 
economic issues in terms of who receives the benefits: working people and small and/or 
“socially beneficial” business, like “green business,” or wealthy individuals and 
corporations. Equitable distribution of income and wealth lead to greater consumption 
since low- and moderate-income individuals have a higher propensity to consume, which 
in turn will lead to greater economic growth. Neo-Keynesians, even more than liberal 
neoclassicalists, focus on ensuring that the fruits of economic growth are distributed fairly, 
instead of supporting policies that would enhance productivity or spur innovation directly. 
Moreover, because fairness and other social outcomes are so important to them, neo-
Keynesians give little attention to issues of allocative efficiency, making them more willing 
to support regulations that “distort” economic activity. 
Innovation Economics 
Unfortunately, none of the three prevailing doctrines offer the kind of economic policy 
framework suitable to the new economic realities of the 21st century. This is largely due to 
three factors. First, each doctrine focuses in an almost Newtonian way on adjusting the 
demand or supply of capital and labor to keep the economy in equilibrium and to secure 
economic growth, which undervalues the importance of innovation. Second, each 
concentrates on macroeconomic factors, particularly prices, rather than on the 
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institutional- and technological-change factors that drive growth, albeit in different ways in 
different countries and times.4 Finally, none of the prevailing doctrines’ principles focus on 
the complex process of technological innovation and the messy and complicated world of 
firms, industries, and national innovation systems as these institutions relate to economic 
growth. 5 While neo-Keynesians recognize that these institutions matter, neoclassicalists fail 
to do so, and neither creates strategies relevant to them.  
The relegation of innovation to, at best, a secondary economic-growth factor is problematic 
given our recent history, where innovation has transformed the economy and powered 
growth. The lack of attention to innovative forces has resulted in the use of 20th century 
conceptualizations, models, and theories to address 21st century challenges. A number of 
economists have acknowledged this logical inconsistency. In response, they have developed 
a new theory and narrative of economic growth to explicitly address and model how 
innovation occurs.6 The doctrine of “innovation economics” reformulates the traditional 
model of economic growth and recognizes knowledge, technology, entrepreneurship, and 
innovation as primary factors for economic growth rather than as independent forces that 
are largely irrelevant in the prevailing doctrinal approaches to economic growth.7 
Beyond the central tenet that innovation drives economic growth, innovation economists 
suggest that productive and adaptive efficiency are the key to understanding how 
innovation creates growth. Productive efficiency is the ability of organizations to 
reorganize production in ways that lead to the greatest output with the fewest inputs, 
including labor inputs, while adaptive efficiency refers to the ability of economies and 
institutions to change over time in response to new situations, in part by developing and 
adopting technological innovations. Thus, innovation economics suggests that the goal of 
economic policy is to improve productive and adaptive efficiency, allowing an individual, 
an organization or firm, and even broader entities, such as industries, cities, and entire 
nations to be more productive and innovative. 
This contrasts with a neoclassical economist’s primary concern for allocative efficiency. As 
innovation economist Richard Lipsey states, “Neoclassical theory stresses the creation of an 
efficient, or optimal, allocation of resources and derives a unique set of policy prescriptions 
that apply with equal force to all economies and all activities, whatever their differences.”8 
From the standpoint of an innovation economist, however, if government policies that 
encourage innovation also “distort” price signals and result in some minor “deadweight” 
loss to the economy, so be it, because the benefits of productive and adaptive efficiency 
normally far exceed any costs to allocative efficiency. In fact, in an innovation economist’s 
world where productive and adaptive efficiency matters and market failures are the norm, 
the role for the public sector is more compelling—it should institute explicit and effective 
innovation economics policies. Thus, while the neoclassical impulse is to remove market 
imperfections or distortions, innovation economics embraces many of those same 
imperfections and characterizes them as important sources of endogenous technological 
change and growth in a dynamic economy. Consequently, some neoclassical 
“impediments” to growth are sources that innovation economics policies seek to encourage. 
Neo-Keynesians prefer a 
command and control 
approach that sets rules 
on the market 
(regulations) and 
provides subsidies to 
ensure a level playing 
field among low- and 
high-carbon energy 
sources. 
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Such policy is particularly apt in areas of the economy, like energy, in which complex 
institutional systems shape the process of innovation, and where the notion of a 
“market” as a unifying principle is too limiting. Economists Richard Lipsey, Kenneth 
Carlaw, and Kenneth Beker argue that in certain sectors the pressure that firms continually 
face about choices of how much and what type of innovation to attempt is not dependent 
on price but on prior capabilities.9 Thus, a firm’s currently feasible innovation choices 
evolve endogenously in a path-dependent way. The United States’ implicit and explicit 
policy support of fossil fuels has created immense path dependency in the energy sector; 
these complexities are not fully amenable to price-induced change. Furthermore, Paul C. 
Stern of the National Academies of Science notes that the neoclassical assumption that 
demand is a smooth function of price, discounts the speed at which price can greatly 
change behavior and fails to recognize that the responses to price increase and decrease are 
not symmetrical.10 Firms tend to respond more to prospects of loss than to prospects of 
gain, institutionalizing path-dependent responses. 
Accordingly, innovation economics endorses government support of innovation and rejects 
the neoclassical economic depiction of innovation as an exogenous process that is solely 
responsive to price signals or that falls like “manna from heaven.”11 Instead, the economy’s 
productive and innovative power is enhanced only through actions of workers, companies, 
entrepreneurs, research institutions, and governments. Thus, while neoclassical economists 
study markets, innovation economists study how firms, research institutions, governments 
and other institutions can best spur innovation. To induce innovation is to be proactive 
with economic policies to facilitate learning and innovation among economic actors 
and support the institutions— including culture, organizations, laws, and networks—
that spur innovation. This is best done with smart public-private partnerships that 
support innovative actions.  
Innovation economics holds that although there is equilibrium in some markets at some 
times, in a growing share of markets in the new knowledge-based economy, 
equilibrium is a fleeting moment. Rather, markets are dynamic and constantly roiled by 
entrepreneurial entry, disruptive technologies, political and social upheavals, changes in 
trade patterns, and more, never settling down into equilibrium. The lack of equilibrium is 
especially characteristic of industries with higher levels of change and innovation. 
Moreover, innovation economists believe that market disequilibrium leads not to economic 
inefficiency but growth and progress.  
Finally, innovation economics recognizes that the information available to economic 
actors is incomplete and uncertain, rendering calculated “rational” decisions difficult, 
particularly within the confines of a neoclassical price model. Innovative activity, 
particularly if it involves a high degree of novelty, typically involves uncertainty, whereby 
outcomes and their associated probabilities are not known at all, rather than by risk, where 
the outcomes are known with a calculable probability. When the economy is characterized 
by uncertainty—as it is today, for example, with respect to energy prices and the 
environment—price signals alone are not the best guide to decision making. In an 
economy with more markets in disequilibrium, the old allocation models no longer provide 
adequate guidance, and relying on price signals alone to drive innovation is not enough. 
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Thus, successful innovations are based on knowledge about users’ needs and about the 
value of the innovation to users. In this sense, smart innovation policies try to fill what is 
fundamentally a knowledge gap. Thus, it is difficult, if not impossible, for individuals and 
firms to make effective decisions under conditions of uncertainty relying only on price 
signals. 
Consequently, innovation economics focuses on facilitating innovative actions and 
supports complex innovation systems with a variety of policy tools in order to move the 
economy in a strategic direction. Innovation economics appreciates that the market is an 
efficient tool to drive economic growth and that government should correct market 
failures. However, contrary to the neoclassical doctrine, just letting markets work is not 
enough. Innovation economics views government intervention through a teleological lens, 
such that government support spurs the economy to achieve productivity and growth at the 
lowest possible societal cost. McKinsey Global Institute Senior Fellow Eric Beinhocker 
suggests that the role of government is essential given the interaction of technological 
innovation, social development, and business practice, and that government should create 
the institutional and policy conditions for effective economic evolution based on a series of 
goals.12 
Economic Doctrines & Climate Change Policy 
To date the United States has responded to the challenge of climate change with at best 
incremental and haphazard policies. Our failure to craft and implement a coherent climate 
change policy is principally rooted in our inability to agree on one economic doctrine.13 
Competing doctrines and reliance on the 20th century doctrines make it tougher to reach 
consensus on the most effective policy approach to climate change. 
The assumptions of the three competing 20th century economic doctrines guide and are 
embedded in climate change policy solutions, from the analysis of the problem to the 
design and implementation of policy (see Table 1). Neoclassical thinkers propose that 
pricing carbon dioxide emissions (the main GHG), either through a tax or trading regime, 
should allow markets to effectively work out a solution; increasing the price of high-carbon 
energy should create space for entrepreneurs and innovative lower- and zero-carbon 
alternatives. At the same time, those guided by neo-Keynesian economics hedge that new 
carbon markets may not be all that efficient and are uncertain at best. They prefer a 
command and control approach that sets rules on the market (regulations) and provides 
subsidies to ensure a level playing field among low- and high-carbon energy sources. The 
conventional doctrines fail to understand that global warming and resulting climate change 
are more than conventional pollution problems, and that complexity, uncertainty, and risk 
create multiple market failures and limit the effectiveness of both traditional market-based 
tools and more recent command-and-control strategies.  
Innovation economics focuses on more than market-mediated price signals, like a carbon 
tax. Innovation economics proposes that to confront the challenges that climate change 
presents, policy must address the market failures, uncertainty and risk for clean energy 
entrepreneurs, and the information asymmetries of today’s energy markets. Although prices 
on GHG emissions are useful, they alone cannot lower GHG emissions to prevent global 
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recognizes knowledge, 
technology, 
entrepreneurship, and 
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temperatures from rising more than two degrees Celsius by 2050. This would require 
policies for stabilization at 450 parts per million of carbon-dioxide-equivalent, 
approximately a 50 to 85 percent reduction in our current emissions.14 As for regulating 
and subsidizing existing generations of renewable energy, innovation economics likewise 
recognizes that these measures do little by themselves to spur the innovation needed to 
create breakthroughs of affordable next-generation alternatives. Only a policy approach 
grounded in innovation economics offers the full range of tools needed to embark upon the 
difficult task of designing a new systematic approach to addressing the institutional hurdles 
of our currently muddled and disparate policy programs on climate change and clean 
energy. 
Innovation economics offers a multi-faceted strategy—an innovation policy framework—
that can address our global predicament with the use of a carbon tax to price GHG, 
complemented by investment in mechanisms and institutions that will spur clean energy 
technology research, development, and deployment. A recent poll showed that people 
increasingly believe that new technologies can solve global warming, up from 30 to 48 
percent in the past two years.15 According to Lord Nicholas Stern, former chief economist 
of the World Bank, “[t]he way forward to the low-carbon economy requires finding new 
ways of consuming and producing, and in particular replacing hydrocarbons. This means 
innovation and investment in new technologies and activities that can save resources while 
producing no greenhouse gases or actually removing them from the atmosphere.”16 
However, the currently debated policies largely ignore this approach, or, in a neoclassical 
manner, reject backing any specific clean energy technology because “picking winners” 
interferes with the market and allocative efficiency.  
The disagreement on policy solutions due to economic doctrine preferences is even more 
consequential given the massive scale of change needed to address global climate change. 
William Bonvillian and Charles Weiss characterize the energy sector as complex, deeply 
entrenched, and heavily subsidized.17 The sector’s current privately funded energy research 
and development spending accounts for less than one-half of one percent of industry 
revenues. This is dismal in comparison to the nationwide industry average (ten times that 
size) and two orders of magnitude less than innovation-intensive industries like IT or 
biomedical technology.18 Bonvillian and Weiss argue that “we should not underestimate 
the difficulty of the process for introducing new technology at the massive scale demanded. 
In energy, this process has eluded us for the last four decades. These complexities 
underscore the need for a comprehensive new theoretical approach.”19 
The following sections describe how current climate policies adopt the principles and 
assumptions of leading economic doctrines and examine the advantages and constraints of 
these proposals in confronting the global challenge of global warming and climate change. 
Neoclassical economics on climate change: carbon pricing or trading Permits 
The principles and assumptions of neoclassical economics suggest the primacy of prices and 
markets as the sole organizing force for economic interaction. The less public policy 
interferes, the argument goes, the more efficient and in equilibrium they will be. As liberal 
neoclassical economist Alan Blinder argues: “Unless the market is malfunctioning, such 
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tax-induced redirections of resources reduce economic efficiency. They are therefore to be 
minimized.”20  
However, the bar for establishing market malfunction is quite high for neoclassical 
economists; and in the case of global warming, the production of GHG is not a normal 
“good” that markets produce. GHG is an environmental externality, where the producer of 
a good emits GHG in the production process, but does not pay for the costs that GHG 
places on the environment, i.e. global warming. Neoclassicalists, therefore, frame global 
warming as a conventional pollution market failure. GHG are a negative externality 
amenable to a market solution, e.g., pricing GHG so that producers, consumers, or a 
combination of them pay for the costs. As neoclassical economist Stephen Holland 
suggests, “Emissions are generally modeled using one of three equivalent approaches: as an 
input in the production process, as a joint product which is a “bad,” or as abatement from 
some hypothetical level, e.g., business as usual.”21 The decision on how to model the 
problem is a direct result of assumptions that will constrain the outcomes as well as policy 
solutions.  
Even though conservative and liberal neoclassical thinkers agree on the basic principle of 
correcting market failures by charging for GHG emissions, their climate policies diverge 
based on their view of the appropriate role of government intervention in the case of a 
negative externality. Some conservative neoclassicalists prefer to completely free energy 
markets of any government intervention, while others propose that a direct carbon tax 
would produce the most efficient results. Many liberal neoclassicalists, on the other hand, 
recognize the limitations of a completely free competitive market and favor tradable carbon 
markets. 
Conservative Neoclassical Approach to Climate Change: Deregulation and Carbon Taxes 
The crux of the climate change debate to the conservative neoclassicalist is ensuring a 
limited role for government in addressing the production of GHG. Two conservative 
approaches to global warming and climate change dominate this basic viewpoint while 
upholding the basic principles of market-mediated prices and allocative efficiency. 
The first, but less prevalent approach in the current policy debate favors complete 
deregulation and elimination of subsidies in energy markets to “let markets work.” In this 
model, there is no need for government policy to correct a market failure by imposing taxes 
on GHG emissions; rather the solution is to reduce existing energy market distortions. J.D. 
Foster, an economist at the Heritage Foundation, stated as much in recent Congressional 
testimony: “Markets are not perfect. Markets make mistakes. And government has a 
modest but clear role to play in the process. But on balance and over time, market 
participants facing price signals undistorted by government policies make fewer mistakes, 
less costly mistakes, and more quickly correct mistakes. Consequently, private markets will 
generally allocate our nation’s resources so as to produce the most value at the least cost.”22  
In an American Enterprise Institute (AEI) policy brief, environmental scientist Kenneth P. 
Green further explains this brand of conservative neoclassical policy.23 He argues that 
decentralization, deregulation, and freeing markets will maximize U.S. adaptation to a 
dynamic, changing climate. The deregulation of electricity markets would result in the 
Innovation economics 
endorses government 
support of innovation 
and rejects the 
neoclassical economics 
depiction of innovation 
as an exogenous process 
that is solely responsive to 
price signals or that falls 
like “manna from 
heaven.” 
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removal of energy subsidies as well as fuel and renewable power mandates so consumers 
would bear the full cost of energy consumption. Deregulation would free markets, and 
with higher prices in place, price-mediated transactions would more readily attain allocative 
efficiency. Higher prices would also incentivize both producers and consumers to press for 
greater conservation, more energy-efficient production processes, appliances, and devices. 
The Cato Institute’s Handbook for Policymakers proposes much the same energy policy and 
opposes legislation on carbon dioxide emissions.24 The Competitive Enterprise Institute 
also follows in this vein.25 
Conservative neoclassicalists are not alone in recognizing that U.S. subsidies of fossil-fuel 
energy create unwise incentives to produce energy with high-carbon fuels. The U.S. Energy 
Information Administration calculated that fossil-fuel-specific energy subsidies were 
approximately $5.06 billion in 2007 in comparison to $2.37 billion for nuclear, wind, 
biomass, solar, wind, geothermal, and renewable.26 The Environmental Law Institute had 
similar estimates for 2002 to 2008, with fossil fuels receiving $72 billion (versus $29 billion 
for renewable energy) in the form of tax breaks that aid foreign oil production, royalty 
relief, tax incentives, direct payments, and other forms of support to the non-renewable 
energy industry.27 Yet, the dollar comparison does not depict the situation completely. The 
more adequate comparison would be on per unit of energy generated; by that standard, 
fossil-fuel subsidies are substantially smaller than those for renewables and other energy 
sources.  
In reality, complete energy deregulation and elimination of all subsidies is politically 
unfeasible. In addition, although ending subsidies for carbon-based fuels will help and is 
advisable, simply letting markets work still fails to fully price the externality. Deregulation 
of energy markets alone would likely not create enough correct incentives to increase low-
carbon energy usage, and with respect to subsidies for renewable energy, would actually 
increase the price of existing lower-carbon sources.  
Recognizing these issues, most conservative neoclassicalists go further and suggest that 
policymakers not only eliminate subsidies but also impose carbon or GHG emissions taxes 
as an optimal market approach to correct for the pollution externality. The carbon or 
GHG emissions tax is calculated on the carbon emissions of energy sources (such as coal, 
oil, and gasoline). These are often referred to as a Pigovian tax (or effluent fee) named after 
the English economist Arthur Pigou who believed that government could internalize a 
negative externality with a tax. Proponents prefer the tax to occur “upstream” in the fossil 
fuel supply chain, such that the “tax is passed forward into the price of coal, natural gas, 
and petroleum products and therefore ultimately into the price of electricity and other 
energy-intensive goods.”28 Figure 1 depicts this dynamic, with Price 1 the original price of 
high-carbon fossil fuels and Price 2 the price adjusted for the carbon tax. The tax doesn’t 
directly affect the price of existing or next-generation clean energy technologies. 
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Proponents agree that such taxes are typically more efficient than other approaches, like cap 
and trade or conservation mandates “because they can encompass virtually all emissions 
sources with minimal administrative burden, thereby maximizing low-cost mitigation 
opportunities.”29 Advocates of this approach include Glenn Hubbard and Greg Mankiw, 
both former chairs of the Council of Economic Advisors under former President George 
W. Bush, Yale University economist William D. Nordhaus, George Mason University 
economist Tyler Cowen, and think tanks like American Enterprise Institute and Heritage 
Foundation.  
Most proponents claim that government should phase in the tax, setting it low initially but 
increasing it over time (as depicted by Price 2 in Figure 1). Nordhaus’ optimal-growth 
framework suggests that an optimal carbon tax rate will need to rise over time due to the 
fact that “emissions are efficiently allocated across time, which implies that low-cost carbon 
resources have scarcity prices…and that carbon-energy prices rise over time.”30 The 
rationale is that an increasing carbon tax rate gives businesses and industries time to adjust 
to price and to plan for investments that would bring about the technologies needed to 
meet the future tax schedule.  
Neoclassical economists believe that a price on pollution (Price 2 in Figure 1) flowing 
through the chains of production, will not only reduce the use of high carbon fuels, but 
also spur innovation to identify low-carbon alternatives and make current clean energy 
sources more competitive. As an American Enterprise Institute report suggests, “a carbon 
tax would create a profit niche for environmental entrepreneurs to find ways to deliver 
lower-carbon energy at competitive prices…[and] serve to level (somewhat) the playing 
field among solar power, wind power, nuclear power, and carbon-based fuels by 
internalizing the cost of carbon emission into the price of the various forms of energy.”31 In 
short, according to the neoclassical doctrine, the new price of high-carbon energy will send 
the correct price signals and induce the appropriate producer, consumer and 
entrepreneurial behaviors.  
Figure 1: Increasing the Price of Fossil Fuels
Price
Price 1 (P1)
Price 2 = P1 + Carbon Tax 
(Permit Price)
Time
Carbon Tax (Conservative Neoclassical)  or 
Permit Price under Cap and Trade (Liberal 
Neoclassical )
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Although some conservatives oppose a carbon tax because they fear it will lead to increased 
government spending, some conservative neoclassical economists suggest that neutralizing 
the effect of the carbon tax by allowing it to offset other existing taxes may help overcome 
some political resistance. Otherwise, in their view, revenue from new carbon taxes would 
just be available for additional government spending which would further distort economic 
activity and reduce incentives for growth. Heritage Foundation economist Dan Mitchell 
goes as far to suggest that “even if somehow government programs could be implemented 
at no cost, they would still harm economic growth.”32 The revenue-neutral option rids the 
market of such distortions. Two versions of this approach exist; every dollar collected via 
the carbon tax either: a) reverts back to U.S. residents, like a dividend, or b) phases out a 
dollar’s worth of existing taxes such as payroll or sales taxes.33 Either revenue-neutral option 
also blunts potential criticism that the carbon tax is another scheme to increase government 
revenues.34  
James Hansen, Director, NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies and an important 
early climate scientist, voiced support for the former option, stating that “[c]arbon fee and 
dividend is the base policy needed to move the nation forward to a clean energy future.”35 
However, unlike more conservative supply-side revenue proposals discussed below, he 
embraces more of an innovation economics approach, suggesting that more is needed, such 
as building and efficiency standards, and public investment in improved infrastructure and 
technology development. Allan Sloan, Fortune magazine’s senior editor, proposes a carbon 
tax with a dividend, to make it politically palatable. He calls for “a heavy tax on electricity, 
gasoline and other energy sources whose use you want to discourage... [and] make that tax 
refundable—at least quarterly, maybe even monthly—for people who can’t afford it.”36 
The second approach to achieving a revenue-neutral carbon tax system employs supply-side 
principles such that the lowering of taxes on labor and capital will decrease the price of the 
input factor and yield greater investment, productivity, and long-term economic growth, 
even with higher energy prices. Arthur Laffer, considered the father of supply-side 
economics, suggested the latter approach in his 2008 New York Times editorial with 
Representative Bob Inglis (R-SC): “We need to impose a tax on the thing we want less of 
(carbon dioxide) and reduce taxes on the things we want more of (income and jobs). A 
carbon tax would attach the national security and environmental costs to carbon-based 
fuels like oil, causing the market to recognize the price of these negative externalities. 
[B]oth Democrats and Republicans could support a carbon tax offset by a payroll or 
income tax cut.”37 Economist Gilbert Metcalf of Tufts University and a research associate 
at the National Bureau of Economic Research agreed and proposed Green Employment 
Tax Swap (GETS), seeking carbon tax neutrality through reduction in all workers’ payroll 
taxes.38  
Tyler Cowen extended the idea further and forwarded his proposal as an “Economic Idea 
#4 that voters need to hear.” He called for the phase out of all forms of capital income 
taxation, including the corporate income tax, and their replacement with a carbon tax, 
including a gasoline tax. “Savings and investment boost economic growth, but when it 
comes to energy, global warming threatens as a major problem and our dependence on 
Middle Eastern oil damages our foreign policy.”39  
Neoclassical economists 
believe that a price on 
pollution flowing through 
the chains of production, 
will not only reduce the 
use of high carbon fuels, 
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Even though AEI’s Green believes that climate change requires a market approach with the 
least intervention and thus complete deregulation, he has also supported a revenue-neutral 
carbon tax, while noting that such a tax system is just an “effort to impose stasis on a 
dynamic system simply using more efficient means.”40 Green and his colleagues Steven 
Hayward and Kevin Hassett suggest that “using the revenues generated from a carbon tax 
to reduce other taxes on productivity (taxes on labor or capital) could mitigate the 
economic damage that would be produced by raising energy prices.”41  
Thus, the key defining characteristic of these conservative neoclassical proposals is to raise 
revenues through a carbon tax and use the money to reduce taxes on capital (and perhaps 
on labor). As discussed above, this is consistent with the conservative neoclassical economic 
doctrine, and in particular, with two key aspects of it: 1) government should do little to 
distort allocative efficiency, and 2) capital accumulation drives growth. With regard to the 
first, a carbon tax is less distorting than subsidies or than cap and trade, which falls on 
some emitters but not others. With regard to the second, reducing taxes on capital (e.g., 
reducing top marginal tax rates, capital gains taxes or dividend taxes) is supposed to spur 
more capital formation, which in turn should lead to faster growth. Likewise, reducing 
taxes on labor should spur more labor- force participation.  
Unlike neo-Keynesians discussed below, neoclassicalists do not want a carbon tax climate 
policy for the purpose of creating green jobs, as recent comments by liberal neoclassical 
economist former Federal Reserve vice chairman Alan Blinder, now of Princeton 
University, illustrates: “There are good reasons to create green jobs, but they have more to 
do with green than with jobs. There is no reason on earth to think that spending money on 
green jobs is more effective than spending on other things.”42 Blinder believes that 
government should impose a gradually increasing carbon tax and do so just after the 
economic downturn ends, arguing that this will automatically create desirable green jobs.  
Critique of Carbon Taxes as the Sole Solution 
The neoclassical focus on price-mediated markets is rooted in the belief that government 
intervention into markets will most likely result in a worse outcome. Markets are 
important, especially at the microeconomic level, and can help ensure that prices usually 
match costs to promote allocative efficiency. Certain markets, especially those characterized 
by stability and slow rates of change, do tend toward equilibrium. The problem is that 
many other markets do not. In the presence of an externality, conservative neoclassicalists 
view the taxing of dirty fossil-fuel-based energy as more acceptable than other cap-and-
trade regulatory measures, or than “picking winners” with a clean energy innovation policy. 
However, the neoclassical conservatives fail to recognize the limits of singular market-based 
approaches to climate change policy.  
The characterizing of GHG emissions as a conventional pollution problem creates a 
number of problems. First, neoclassical theory suggests that the tax and resulting increase 
in high-carbon energy prices will reduce demand, and thus reduce output. Although 
individuals and organizations are rational and respond appropriately to incentives, they 
may not do so all the time. According to David Andress, T. Dean Nguyen, and Sujit Das, 
“entities who are willing to pay the price can continue to pollute and even increase their 
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pollution,” particularly if it is economically feasible to do so because the carbon tax is not 
high enough.43 Also, unless government imposes carbon taxes consistently across all 
emitting sectors, this problem is exacerbated. And unless all nations impose the same level 
of carbon tax on the same sources, all firms and sectors will not face the same tax. Actually, 
nations could easily develop into GHG havens, which would then require an additional 
policy mechanism/government intervention, like the reverse tariff present in some cap-and-
trade legislation discussed below. 
Second, uncertainty about carbon-price sensitivity and what an “optimal price” should be 
raises the probability that emitters will continue to pollute under a market solution. 
Determining what the tax should be to achieve climate goals or to match external costs is 
difficult. For example, Nordhaus’ 2010 DICE/RICE models indicate that a price on 
carbon should be in the range of $40 per ton, much greater than his 2005 model predicted 
($17 per ton) and equivalent to 5 cents per gallon of gasoline and one-tenth of a cent per 
kilowatt-hour of electricity.44 Paul Krugman, a noted liberal neoclassical economist, 
explains the difficulty succinctly: “you can’t put a price on something unless you can 
measure it accurately, and that can be both difficult and expensive.”45 Consequently, the 
variability in these estimates makes it difficult to assign the “right” price to GHG 
emissions. 
Third, making the carbon tax revenue-neutral is somewhat problematic. In theory, as 
carbon prices increase, producers and consumers will change their behaviors, and in the 
long run carbon tax revenue would decrease if tax rates are not increased. Most tax 
proponents do not explore this aspect, and others argue that “as utilities install more costly 
low-carbon technologies to avoid escalating carbon taxes, consumers lose the carbon tax 
rebates. However, they still see their electricity costs increasing as utilities include the cost 
of carbon mitigation in consumer bills. Ironically, low-energy consumers are better off with 
the rebated carbon taxes.”46  
Related to the desired market response is the neoclassical belief that markets and not 
governments are best at determining innovation trajectories to solve a problem. The major 
advantage of a carbon tax, they argue, is that business and entrepreneurs will pick the 
winning low-carbon technology substitutes for fossil fuels. Neoclassical conservatives do 
not support the subsidization of either renewable energy or of research and development of 
next-generation green energy technologies since this would result in picking winners and 
inject perverse incentives into the market. Instead, market winners in a carbon-priced 
market receive the blessing of venture capital and credit markets for the level of investment 
for research and development (R&D), demonstration, and deployment required to push 
the clean technology through the commercialization process to market. Once the “right” 
carbon price is set, the magic of price-mediated markets alone will produce the most 
efficient clean energy alternatives.  
In this view, the clearing of energy markets produces allocative efficiency across all related 
markets, and the necessary innovation to produce clean energy substitutes should be the 
outcome. Many neoclassical climate models just assume technological change will occur or 
treat it exogenously, and most of these models are extremely sensitive to the rate of 
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technical change. Neoclassical proponents suggest that carbon pricing will deliver better 
technologies. However, as the fourth problem, such automatic clearing of markets based 
only on a change in the price of carbon ignores the presence of other market failures 
associated with innovative activity. Unfortunately, innovation is more problematic than 
neoclassical models suggest and will not fall like manna from heaven. 
If higher carbon prices are really the key to spurring change, then we should see clean 
energy innovation in nations with higher carbon prices. But we don’t. In many European 
nations, the price on carbon dioxide for transportation fuels is over $200 per ton, which is 
the amount reflected in their overall transportation fuel taxes. This is at least 5 to 10 times 
higher than the cost suggested by many neoclassical proponents of carbon taxes.47 
Europeans do drive smaller cars and drive less than Americans, but only some of this is 
attributable to higher tax. Most drove less before the imposition of high fuel taxes, and the 
density of Europe has made it more amenable to transit and walking. Small, medieval 
urban streets make large cars impractical in many parts of Europe. Moreover, the higher tax 
certainly has not induced Europeans to switch to electric cars. In fact, there are virtually no 
electric cars in Europe. The reason is simple: price signals lead to behavior change only 
when there is a viable substitute. Europeans, like the rest of us, will drive electric cars when 
there are better batteries and the infrastructure that supports electric vehicles. If beef 
suddenly tripled in price this past summer, Americans would be grilling a lot more chicken. 
Preferences aside, there is a less expensive substitute for beef. This is not the case when it 
comes to energy alternatives. Electric cars, for example, are still at the prototype stage and 
priced well out of reach for most U.S. consumers. Without the $7,500 tax credit, the 
Nissan Leaf will start at $32,800, while the Chevrolet Volt will be $41,000, and the lauded 
Tesla Roadster is a luxury at $109,000. Even those who can afford these vehicles face an 
inadequate infrastructure for wide-ranging use.  
Innovation is a complex process, and price alone will not induce all types of innovation in 
similar ways. Economist Vernon Ruttan of the University of Minnesota showed that price 
was certainly a factor in what he called “induced innovation;” however, he was largely 
referring to incremental innovation and engineering advances that are industry led, shorter 
term, and therefore, more responsive to price and market signals.48 Induced innovation will 
be very important to energy technologies like solar photovoltaic that have been around for 
years and that focus on incremental advances to drive down price. In contrast, next-
generation clean energy innovation will require radical or breakthrough technologies, often 
coined “pipeline innovation,” which is long term in nature and less price sensitive at the 
R&D stages. To complicate the process further, existing innovation systems (rules, 
regulations, culture, etc…) as well as information asymmetries, uncertainty, risk, 
technology-path dependency, chicken-or-egg externalities, and a host of other “failures” 
affect the actions of innovators and entrepreneurs in the market. Specifically, entrepreneurs 
in the research and development phase encounter great uncertainty in market conditions. 
Couple this with the fact that pipeline innovation requires pushing a breakthrough idea 
through the valley of death—the phase in the development of technologies between 
research and commercial introduction in the marketplace—to translate it into a usable, 
market-worthy option. Thus, policies to enable innovations systems must overcome 
multiple of stumbling blocks.  
If higher carbon prices 
are really the key to 
spurring change, then we 
should see clean energy 
innovation in nations 
with higher carbon 
prices. But we don’t. 
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In addition, a classic market failure that potential entrepreneurs of breakthroughs 
encounter is the knowledge externality. Innovators generally, and clean-energy innovators 
in particular, recover only a portion of the benefits their technologies produce. Innovation 
economists Phillipe Aghion, David Hemous, and Reinhilde Veugelers argue that most 
companies make the rational business decision to under-invest in fundamentally new green 
technologies, preferring to “free ride” off existing dirtier technologies that are cheaper.49 
They, as well as others like MIT innovation economist Daron Acemoglu, claim that when 
climate change policy includes only a carbon tax, the market will pick the cheapest existing 
lower-carbon technology. Entrepreneurs will choose to make incremental improvements to 
existing technologies rather than invest in the development of next-generation clean 
technology. The productivity gap between dirty fossil fuel and next-generation clean 
technologies will become even greater than it was before a carbon tax, and, according to 
economists Philippe Aghion, David Hemous, and Reinhilde Veugelers, the widened 
productivity gap “means that a longer period is needed for clean technologies to catch up 
and replace the dirty ones. As this catching-up period is characterized by slower 
growth…delaying action is costly.”50 Thus, a climate change policy that includes only a 
carbon tax results in reliance on existing low-carbon technologies that will slow our 
reduction in emissions and fail to generate the 85 percent reduction in carbon emissions 
per unit of output that, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the 
planet requires by 2050.51  
A carbon tax has considerable merits in that it is the most efficient single mechanism for 
setting a price on carbon. Such a tax across all sectors in a market, perfect information and 
rational actors, could lead to greater innovation and commercialization of clean energy. 
However, as a sole solution to climate change it ignores a series of other market failures that 
are especially pervasive in the present the energy sector. As described above, unless 
government crafts a clean energy strategy and co-invests in clean energy innovation, the 
carbon tax will more than likely support current “dirtier” low-carbon technologies instead 
of needed zero-carbon alternatives. This has global implications. If the market does not 
respond optimally with affordable clean technologies, the lack of adequate substitutes will 
most likely drive heavy polluters’ production – and their jobs – offshore to nations where 
carbon taxes do not exist or are lower. The generated “carbon leakage” in turn hurts the 
global climate.  
Furthermore, a global solution to climate change requires affordable clean technologies for 
countries that do not have the political will to impose carbon taxes. With the world’s 
population forecasted to increase from 6.7 billion to 9 billion by 2030, global energy 
consumption and GHG emissions could effectively double. Even if the United States 
somehow finds the political will to impose high, or even moderate carbon prices, this does 
not address the global challenge. The only way it could do so is by spearheading the 
development of clean energy alternatives that are lower priced than conventional carbon-
based fuels sources. As neoclassicalists argue, it is irrational for economic actors to pay more 
for clean energy than they would for dirty energy. Likewise, it is irrational for individual 
nations to impose carbon taxes unless the majority of nations do so at the same time since 
the costs are borne nationally, while the benefits are global.  And, as discussed above, 
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carbon taxes do not lead to the development of the most efficient, lowest-cost and globally 
affordable clean energy alternatives. 
Table 1: Comparison of the Economic Doctrines on Climate Change 
Factor Neoclassical Economics    
Conservative 
neoclassical 
(“supply-side”) 
doctrine 
Liberal 
neoclassical 
doctrine 
(“Rubinomics”) 
Neo-Keynesian 
Economic 
Doctrine 
Innovation 
Economics 
Doctrine 
Locus of economic 
growth 
Supply-side 
(individuals and 
organizations) 
Supply-side 
(individuals and 
organizations) 
Demand-side Supply-side 
(organizations, 
entrepreneurs, 
and 
“prosumers”) 
Principal economic 
policy goal 
Growth and 
managing the 
business cycle 
Efficiency and 
managing the 
business cycle 
Equitable 
distribution of 
wealth to 
achieve social 
policy 
objectives 
Growth and 
innovation 
Key economic 
process 
Allocative 
efficiency 
Allocative 
efficiency 
Consumer 
demand, full 
employment 
Productive 
efficiency and 
adaptive 
efficiency 
Organizing principles Price-mediated 
markets in 
general 
equilibrium; 
complete 
information; 
individuals 
respond 
rationally to 
maximize self-
interest 
Price-mediated 
markets in 
general 
equilibrium; 
complete 
information; 
individuals 
respond 
rationally to 
maximize self-
interest 
Government-
controlled 
markets; 
protect social 
good 
Complex 
institutional 
systems with 
uncertainty and 
market 
disequilibrium; 
information is 
incomplete and 
uncertain 
Organization of 
government 
Limited Focused on the 
basics 
Big 
bureaucratic 
government 
Reinvented 
government and 
increased 
reliance on 
quasi-public 
organizations 
and public-
private 
partnerships 
Climate Change Carbon tax 
(revenue 
neutral), 
deregulation of 
energy market 
Cap and trade, 
with emphasis 
on trade 
Carbon caps, 
direct 
regulation, 
and subsidies 
Clean energy 
innovation 
strategy to 
include carbon 
tax and research 
and 
development 
policies for 
clean 
technologies 
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Liberal Neoclassical Approach to Climate Change: Carbon Trading 
Liberal neoclassical economists agree with their conservative brethren that price-mediated 
markets are the ideal allocation mechanism. Yet unlike the conservatives, who are wary of 
government intervention, liberal neoclassicalists justify a stronger role for government. 
Prominent neoclassical economist Paul Krugman suggests that “When there are ‘negative 
externalities’—costs that economic actors impose on others without paying a price for their 
actions—any presumption that the market economy, left to its own devices, will do the 
right thing goes out the window.”52 However, the achievement of social goals should occur 
through “aftermarket” interventions. Like a good neoclassicalist, he continues “we should 
let markets do their job, making efficient use of the nation’s resources, then utilize taxes 
and transfers to help those whom the market passes by.”53 
The liberal neoclassical approach recognizes the need for government to correct for energy-
production by-products of GHG emissions. Like conservative neoclassicalists, they believe 
that higher energy prices will lead to more supply and less demand, but in the pursuit of 
equity they are less willing than conservative supply-siders to eliminate regulatory 
protections (i.e., permit offshore drilling) to expand supply. And they are somewhat more 
willing to consider government support for particular energy technologies, especially if the 
support is limited to basic research. Their major difference with conservative 
neoclassicalists is that they want to rely on market forces, not through carbon taxes but 
through GHG emissions trading, often referred to as a “cap-and-trade” regime, which is 
basically a government-facilitated quasi-market that is intended to correct for the GHG 
externality.  
The ‘‘cap’’ sets a nationwide limit on GHG emissions that decreases over time. Although 
both a cap and a carbon tax should reduce emissions, liberal neoclassicalists support the 
cap-and-trade regime because they see the trading mechanism, backed up by the gradually 
decreasing cap, as providing more assurance of reaching climate change goals while still 
reaping the benefits of market-based allocation efficiency. 
Still, the determination of an appropriate cap is essential, and similar uncertainties come to 
play in reaching an emissions goal as in setting a carbon price. Krugman explains: “If the 
government imposes a pollution tax, polluters know what price they will have to pay, but 
the government does not know how much pollution they will generate. If the government 
imposes a cap, it knows the amount of pollution, but polluters do not know what the price 
of emissions will be.”54 Consequently, the ‘‘trade’’ mechanism allows the price of polluting 
to emerge based on the cap, or number of carbon permits conveying the right to emit a 
specific volume of carbon or GHG. Environmental policymaker Geoffrey Styles 
demonstrates the importance of trade. Consistent with the conservative neoclassical view, 
he states: “…I have little doubt that a blue-ribbon panel of economists, scientists and 
engineers could come up with a reasonable estimate of the level of carbon taxation required 
to reduce emissions by the desired amount...” But in liberal neoclassical form, he adds, “I 
have much more confidence in the logic of setting the desired level of emissions reduction 
in each year, and then allowing the price to emerge from the interaction of those whose 
livelihoods depend on meeting these limits, in real time.”55 Thus, liberal neoclassicalists 
argue that the higher costs of emissions resulting from a cap will reduce emissions, and that 
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the trading of permits will lower the cost of attaining emission goals because it will let the 
market decide which emissions reductions should be prioritized. 
For market transactions to reduce GHG under cap and trade, the number of allowances 
should be small, increasing the price of the right to pollute. In Figure 1, above, Price 2 
under cap and trade reflects the increase in the cost of fossil fuels due to the cost of 
obtaining the permit to pollute. Over time, the decreasing number of permits should 
increase the price of obtaining the permit; again, the cap has no direct price effect on clean 
energy technologies. A more conservative cap-and-trade regime would have government 
selling permits to firms that emit the pollution, and the market determining the most 
efficient distribution of permits. On the other end, in a liberal regime the government 
would allocate the “allowances”—a more appropriate name given the difference between 
selling and granting the permits—based on current emission profiles or industrial sectors. 
In terms of U.S. climate policy, the recent cap-and-trade Congressional proposals include 
some combination of the two, as in the American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES) 
of 2009 that passed the House of Representatives and the more recent, failed proposal of 
Senators John Kerry (D-MA) and Joe Lieberman (I-CT), the American Power Act (APA) 
of 2010. 56 
The determination of how to distribute allowances is contentious given how political 
factors influence the decision process, although this is similar to how politics can affect 
decisions about the carbon tax (e.g., tax rebates may be given preferentially to groups that 
are supportive). Neoclassical economics refer to this as another failure, but not a market 
failure; rather, it is a government failure called rent-seeking. Government determining who 
gets the allowances leads to lobbying and waste of resources which can further “distort” the 
market. Krugman points out that a carbon tax imposes costs on the private sector and 
generates revenue for the government, while a cap-and-trade regime “is a bit more 
complicated. If the government simply auctions off licenses and collects the revenue, then 
it is just like a tax. Cap and trade, however, often involves handing out licenses to existing 
players, so the potential revenue goes to industry instead of the government.”57 
Along with political factors, liberal neoclassical principles also shape the distribution of 
incomes, as the doctrine is more comfortable with greater government intervention to 
achieve equitable outcomes among income groups and regions. An AEI report from 
conservative neoclassical economists Kevin A. Hassett, Aparna Mathur and Gilbert E. 
Metcalf suggests that the lifetime incidence of a carbon tax on household consumption was 
distributionally neutral across regions.58 Liberal neoclassical economists Daniel Burtraw, 
Richard Sweeney, and Margaret Wells at Resources for the Future countered this finding in 
their analysis of a cap-and-trade regime. They found that the distributional effects were 
larger based on an annualized incidence, which magnifies disparate impacts among income 
groups and regional differences. This is in contrast to the lifetime incidence analysis that 
tends to minimize such impacts.59  
Current proposals address each of these disparities. ACES and APA provide more free 
allowances to geographically-concentrated, high-carbon utilities’ sectors to manage regional 
disparities. For example, the cap on coal-based energy providers/producers would require 
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them to reduce carbon emissions, and providers would be able to trade credits among 
themselves and with other energy producers. With regard to regional household disparities, 
those in regions that would pay lower energy rates would also receive proportionately lower 
payroll tax reductions or direct distributions of revenue—often referred to as a “cap and 
dividend” as seen in Senators Maria Cantwell’s (D-WA) and Susan Collins’ (R-ME) 
Carbon Limits and Energy for America’s Renewal (CLEAR) Act.60  
Over the past two decades, the cap and trade approach to climate change has attracted a 
number of liberal neoclassical thinkers who once preferred carbon taxes and who now see 
the “trade” portion of cap and trade as an appealing alternative to pure command and 
control regulation. Liberal neoclassicalist Lawrence Summers, Director of the National 
Economic Council and outgoing Assistant to President Obama for Economic Policy, 
previously stated his preference for “carbon and/or gasoline tax measures to permit systems 
or heavy regulatory approaches because the latter are more likely to be economically 
inefficient and to be regressive.”61 But given the Obama administration’s ruling out of a 
carbon tax, Summers suggests that a cap-and-trade program is a workable solution if it 
includes an escape clause when prices rise too quickly. Other liberal neoclassical proponents 
include Paul Krugman, Gene Sperling (the former head of President Clinton’s National 
Economic Council and now Adviser to Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner), and Peter 
Orszag (former director of the Office of Management and Budget and former head of the 
Congressional Budget Office); and organizations like the Center for American Progress 
(also home to some Neo-Keynesians), the Progressive Policy Institute, and the United 
States Climate Action Partnership. 62 63 64 
Critique of Cap-and-Trade Regimes 
The “trade” portion of cap and trade is the product of the neoclassical belief that price-
mediated markets will result in firms reacting rationally to the price on carbon, and some 
of the time this will occur. The liberal neoclassical doctrine’s embracing of cap and trade 
assumes that all polluters face differential marginal costs to reduce their emissions. 
However, each polluter will compare the cost of a permit against the cost of reducing 
carbon emissions. If the incremental cost of emissions reduction is less than or equal to the 
permit cost, polluters will reduce emissions. If not, and it is profitable for the firm to 
continue doing “business as usual,” it will buy permits to cover emissions from other firms 
that can cut emissions at a lower cost. The assumption is that the latter will undertake 
more abatement relative to firms facing higher costs. Thus, in contrast to the neo-
Keynesian “cap” regime, the trade-enabled “market” in cap and trade determines which 
firms make deeper cuts to their emissions and which make shallower or no cuts. 
There are several problems with cap and trade, many of them similar to the problems of a 
carbon tax. First, to the extent that proponents favor it because it imposes a cost on GHG 
emissions, it faces the same problems as a carbon tax regime, which is also supposed to 
induce low-cost compliance. In particular, solving global climate requires the development 
of low-cost, ubiquitous clean energy. Cap and trade and carbon taxes assume that this will 
simply happen. 
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Second, cap-and-trade regimes also encounter information asymmetry and uncertainties as 
to the appropriate cap. As discussed above, cap and trade “requires a considerable amount 
of information and expertise to get the emission-allocation process right, creating more 
room for error and exposure to political pressure.”65 It also requires government to design 
new institutions and give power to some organization to administer the trading system. 
The level of government intervention is what leads conservative neoclassical economists to 
believe that “cap-and-trade is too cumbersome to administer and could lead to speculators 
distorting the emissions trading market.”66 Regulators face great uncertainty in setting the 
cap, just as they would in setting the carbon tax level, because they do not know whether 
the benefits of reducing carbon emissions are higher or lower than originally anticipated.67  
Much of the U.S experience with cap and trade builds off its acid rain experience and the 
market-based abatement of sulfur dioxide under the Clean Air Act amendments.68 As 
Krugman stated, “The bottom line, then, is that while climate change may be a vastly 
bigger problem than acid rain, the logic of how to respond to it is much the same. What 
we need are market incentives for reducing greenhouse-gas emissions—along with some 
direct controls over coal use—and cap and trade is a reasonable way to create those 
incentives.”69 The problem is that acid rain and climate change are really not that 
comparable, particularly in scale and technology. Unlike GHG’s global warming effect, 
acid rain was more geographically concentrated. Only one sector, coal-fired power plants, 
fell under the cap. And most pertinent, mitigation technologies to achieve reductions 
existed, enabling plants to either switch to low-sulfur coal or install scrubbers that captured 
and sequestered sulfur dioxide.  
One part of the acid rain history is particularly instructive to today’s debate: the significant 
price volatility of sulfur dioxide trading permits. This price volatility will likely be repeated 
under any proposed GHG cap-and-trade regime given the breadth of GHG-producing 
sectors that will put pressure on permit prices. With the supply of permits limited, demand 
for permits will likely vary over time due to changes in the demand for energy and natural 
gas prices. The industrial and geographical scope of the problem coupled with volatility of 
permit prices further increases uncertainty, particularly for innovators. As Resources for the 
Future economists Ian Parry and William Pizer note, the “volatility in permit prices may 
deter carbon-saving investments in capital or R&D that have high up-front costs: the long-
term payoffs to a firm are very uncertain if the future price of CO2 is unknown….because 
firms can choose to abate less and pay more tax in periods when abatement costs are 
unusually high, and vice versa in periods when abatement costs are low.”70  
As discussed above in the carbon tax section, price volatility will tend to affect what types 
of lower carbon technologies may be adopted. The current price volatility in oil and gas 
markets is illustrative. The Clean Energy Group and Meridian Institute found that not 
only would the “cheapest existing low-carbon technologies and energy-efficiency measures 
(often called “no regrets” policies)” win in the market, but also that “any caps established 
are usually insufficient to drive deep and radical innovation; instead, they tend to drive 
incremental technical improvements and marginal cost reductions.”71 Similar to discussions 
above in regard to carbon taxes, the absence of viable, clean-technology substitutes creates a 
similar failure in a carbon trading regime. However, as a cap fails to decrease the total 
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volume of emissions, the lack of low-carbon alternatives will likely increase the price 
significantly, and in turn decrease political support. Consequently, only more fundamental 
technical improvements and significant cost reductions will enable the global economic 
system to shift away from carbon-based fuels. This is discussed more fully below in the 
innovation economics section. 
Further, as Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger of the innovation economics-based 
Breakthrough Institute recently suggested, emissions caps offer no certainty in reducing in 
emissions. As they put it, carbon caps are often met with “a variety of mechanisms, overt 
and covert, to control the costs of complying with emissions-reduction mandates. These 
have included over-allocating emissions allowances, ‘borrowing’ allowances from future 
compliance periods, exempting critical industries from emissions-reduction requirements, 
allowing for the purchase of ‘hot air’ from former Eastern bloc nations whose emissions 
declined sharply after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, and the purchase of carbon 
offsets from developing economies in lieu of actual emissions reductions.”72 In addition, 
the proposed regimes fail to capture all GHG emitters, and particularly small emitters for 
whom the costs of measuring emissions and engaging in trading are prohibitive; no matter 
how low a cap goes, they are a likely source of carbon leakage.  
The initial trial period of the European Union’s European Trading Scheme served as an 
example, when it gave away a large majority of permits in the first two phases (through 
2013) while failing to cover all emitters. German bargaining resulted in heavy industry 
receiving free carbon credits as well as weaker penalties for noncompliance, and many other 
countries received similar arrangements.73 As James Kanter of the New York Times noted: 
Its implementation has been marked by maneuvers and adjustments to the original 
framework that have yielded significant cost benefits to many of the continent's 
biggest polluting industries. Meanwhile, the amount of CO2 emitted by plants 
and factories participating in the system rose 0.4 percent in 2006 and an additional 
0.7 percent in 2007.74  
Although the European Commission proposed a number of amendments to address these 
issues, such as including the chemicals and aluminum industrial sectors that were initially 
excluded, they are currently still in draft stage and would not be in effect before 2013.75 
Thus, cap and trade alone cannot address the challenges and multiple failures that climate 
change policy must address. 
Neo-Keynesian Economics on Climate Change: Carbon Caps, Direct Regulation, and 
Subsidies 
Neo-Keynesians’ beliefs in demand-driven economic growth and the subsequent equitable 
redistribution of wealth frame their three approaches to climate change: carbon caps, direct 
regulation, and subsidies. According to economist Jonathan Harris, neo-Keynesian 
thinking on climate change is suggestive of their macroeconomic view: 
The imperfections, asymmetries, and market failures which they see as leading to 
macroeconomic problems may often also be associated with environmental and 
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resource abuses and social inequities. But the more radical macroeconomic 
formulation—that market economies are inherently prone to severe 
disequilibrium, and that informed social intervention is essential for a sustainable 
society—is closer both in spirit and in content to the radical critiques of “optimal” 
market outcomes and smooth economic growth which have been advanced by 
Herman Daly, Richard Norgaard, and many others associated with an ecological 
economics perspective.76  
Neo-Keynesians address climate change and GHG emissions with the goal of reducing 
social and environmental inequities. In doing so, their focus is less market dependent than 
that of the other three doctrines. They give little thought to the question of how firms 
should respond to the need for reducing GHG emissions. Rather, the job of government is 
to tell them to do it. And for emerging industries like renewables, government should 
provide subsidies to enable them to compete with lower cost carbon-based fuels. In their 
view, cap and trade is really about the regulated cap on emissions, with the trading 
component as a side benefit. They also seek to cap emissions with direct regulation to 
increase the use of current alternative energy sources or energy-efficiency products, as with 
renewable portfolio standards, fuel economy standards, and energy-efficiency standards for 
buildings and industry. Finally, neo-Keynesians view direct subsidization of renewable 
energy as a means of reducing the cost penalty it now faces in the marketplace. These 
measures include feed-in tariffs, electric vehicle tax credits, and financial tools and 
incentives, like “green banks,” revolving loan funds and “cash for caulkers,” which seek to 
increase renewable energy adoption and induce energy efficiency. This policy toolbox 
reinforces neo-Keynesian focus on demand-driven growth because mandating the use of or 
subsidizing the supply of alternative energy will induce demand, which will subsequently 
and automatically further drive supply. Neo-Keynesian proponents include many 
environmentalists like James G. Speth, environmental lawyer and founder of the World 
Resources Institute, ecological economists Herman Daly and Juliet Schor, Joe Romm of 
Center for American Progress and ClimateProgress.org blog, Manik “Nikki” Roy of the 
Pew Center on Global Climate, journalist Lisa Margonelli, and organizations and think-
tanks like Blue Green Alliance, New America Foundation, New Economics Institute, and 
the Levy Economics Institute. 77 78 79 80 
Many neo-Keynesians prefer a government mandate on the upper limit of GHG emissions 
with a command-and-control policy response like a complete ban on coal-fired plants. But 
because GHG emissions are not localized, they are willing to consider allowing emitters to 
trade permits for these emissions. In part, they have embraced cap-and-trade policies to 
reduce political opposition and to make it appear that this is not just old-fashioned 
command and control regulation, but something market-based and, hence, more politically 
feasible. Neo-Keynesian support of a cap-and-trade regime may at first glance suggest that 
that they have accepted liberal neoclassical market trading solutions; however, this is only 
because they view cap and trade as a way to limit emissions. The institution designed to 
enforce the cap-and-trade system is a regulatory mechanism that emphasizes the cap, not 
the trade. Although Paul Krugman’s roots are liberal neoclassical, his recent comments 
about the difficulty of pricing carbon reflect his transition toward more liberal neo-
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Keynesian economics when he writes that “sometimes it’s better simply to lay down some 
basic rules about what people can and cannot do.”81 
Neo-Keynesians believe that a cap-and-trade regime will open a window of opportunity for 
low-carbon alternatives to become competitive and grow in market share; however, in 
contrast to the neoclassical approach, the belief is that the market will simply not be 
allowed to produce high-carbon activities, and will therefore simply have to switch to low-
carbon ones. Given that the latter are more expensive, in some cases much more expensive, 
neo-Keynesians see government subsidization of low-carbon activities as necessary to their 
competitiveness. Thus, in order to further direct the market in a clean energy direction, 
neo-Keynesians pair subsidies of existing technologies with direct regulation. 
Direct regulation or mandates reflect neo-Keynesians’ penchant for command and control 
regulation. This is why they support the requirement of a renewable energy (portfolio) 
standard (RES/RPS). RES and RPS impose a legal obligation on electricity supply 
companies to produce a specified fraction of their electricity from certified renewable 
energy. Certified renewable energy generators earn certificates for every unit of electricity 
so-produced, and they can sell these along with their electricity to the supply companies. 
To ensure compliance, electricity supply companies must pass the certificates to a 
regulatory body to demonstrate their compliance with their regulatory obligations. Thus 
this adds a level of regulation to the portfolio requirement to ensure that only certified 
providers of renewable energy are participating. Many states have these mechanisms, and 
they are currently proposed in federal energy bills. Senator Jeff Bingaman’s (D-NM) 
proposed energy bill, American Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009, would set a 15 
percent national RPS by 2021 in conjunction with subsidies to be discussed below.82 Even 
though Senator Richard Lugar’s (R-IN) approach is not neo-Keynesian, his recently 
proposed Practical Energy and Climate Plan builds off of an RES base.83 His diverse energy 
standard (DES) is looser, allowing any carbon-free energy standard beyond renewables; 
thus, coal with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) and nuclear energy would qualify.  
Other traditional neo-Keynesian regulatory approaches include federal rulemaking and 
energy performance standards on fuel economy, e.g., Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
(CAFE) and other efficiency standards. In the absence of climate change legislation, the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is finalizing a rule on GHG emissions. As 
EPA administrator Lisa P. Jackson recently explained, the “EPA has set common-sense 
thresholds for greenhouse gases that will spark clean technology innovation.”84 Examples of 
the latter include Senator Lugar’s recent legislation containing provisions for federal- and 
national-building energy performance that targets federal and new residential and 
commercial construction and new fuel economy standards. These mandates are paired with 
governments matching grants for the $500 million per year through 2014, illustrating 
common neo-Keynesian combinations. 
As the third major climate change tool, neo-Keynesians advocate assisting desirable 
industries with subsidies. In contrast to neoclassicalists, who see subsidies as distorting the 
market, neo-Keynesians view subsidies as simply one more tool government can use to 
achieve desired economic and social outcomes. They view subsidies as a way to help 
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increase the supply of low-carbon energy alternatives and provide market pull or induced 
demand for existing renewable energy sources. Such subsidies decrease the consumer’s 
price, as depicted below in Figure 2, with Price 2 falling below Price 1, the original price of 
the existing low-carbon technology. But absent technological innovation to drive down 
costs of renewables (as shown with Price 3), the subsidies must be in place in perpetuity. 
 
A favorite neo-Keynesian subsidy of current alternative energy production is the feed-in 
tariff (FIT). FITs are long-term contracts in which traditional electricity providers purchase 
renewable energy (solar, wind, geothermal, etc…) from renewable providers at an agreed-
on price based on the cost of its generation. The conventional electricity provider subsidizes 
the renewable provider, which enables the conventional electricity generator to meet any 
requirements on the percentage of renewable energy it must offer in an RPS/RES or to 
reduce output of carbon emissions under a cap. FITs are prevalent in European countries 
like Spain and Germany. The Sacramento Municipal Utility District has recently signed its 
first purchase agreements for 60 megawatts of solar power. 
A second neo-Keynesian subsidy tool is the tax credit. The American Reinvestment and 
Recovery Act of 2009 (ARRA) authorized the Department of Treasury to award $2.3 
billion in tax credits for qualified investments in advanced energy projects to support new, 
expanded, or re-equipped domestic manufacturing facilities. 8586 The Section 48c clean 
technology production tax credits help support U.S. manufacturing capacity to supply 
clean energy projects with U.S made parts and equipment.  
Beyond encouraging clean energy alternatives, neo-Keynesians also favor subsidies to 
incentivize behaviors like improvements in building and home energy efficiency with better 
insulation, windows, and solar panels. Senator Bingaman’s proposed legislation (see above) 
provides grants to state-level lenders to support revolving loan funds for commercial and 
industrial manufacturers implementing technologies that improve industrial efficiency. Tax 
credits that target consumer behaviors support the past purchase of hybrids and present 
purchase of electric vehicles like the Chevrolet Volt. The Home Star program, which 
Figure 2: Lowering the Price of Low-Carbon Clean Energy
Price
Price 1 (P1)
Price 3 = declining 
marginal cost curve due 
to innovation 
(Innovation Economics)
Time
Price 2 = P1 - Subsidy
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passed the House, is dubbed “cash for caulkers” since it would provide an energy tax credit 
for home renovations to improve energy efficiency as with better insulation. Even the 
stimulus’ “cash for clunkers” rebate sought to incentivize buyers to replace gas-guzzling 
vehicles with more fuel-efficient models. And “feebates” encourage consumers to purchase 
fuel-efficient cars because the rebate rises with the level of gasoline savings.  
A final category of neo-Keynesian subsidization more broadly encourages businesses that 
neo-Keynesians find desirable, for example, businesses that provide green jobs that also 
would spur clean energy through the demand-driven principle they embrace. Green 
businesses can cover a variety of business models, from renewable energy providers to 
service-oriented businesses that sell energy-efficiency plans and retrofits; additional benefits 
are realized if these businesses are rooted in disadvantaged communities. To facilitate the 
growth of preferred businesses, neo-Keynesians seek to subsidize their costs, as with tax 
incentives described above. In addition, they favor the creation of new financial institutions 
or “green banks,” referred to as a clean energy national infrastructure bank, Green Energy 
Lending Authority, and Energy Independence Trust. Proposals for these “green banks” 
often include financing support, such as loan guarantees, for the near-term and wide-scale 
deployment of commercially-ready clean energy technologies and other financing tools for 
energy retrofit and conventional clean energy generation projects. The Coalition for Green 
Capital is a proponent of ideas that were presented in Representative Chris Van Hollen’s 
(D-MD) proposed The Green Bank Act of 2009, including a board composed of the 
Secretaries of Energy, Interior, and Treasury, and Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency.87  
Critique of Neo-Keynesian Approaches to Climate Change 
The Neo-Keynesian toolbox for climate change is based on a belief that government should 
direct the outcomes it wants, and that promoting policies that seek to decrease GHG is 
important. In this sense, cap and trade is just one instrument to begin restricting emissions, 
to be accompanied by further regulation and subsidization. As described in the liberal 
neoclassical section above, a number of issues plague cap and trade. However, none is more 
problematic than the neo-Keynesian view that the cap in cap and trade acts as a 
“guarantee” that emitters will produce less carbon emissions, particularly as the cap reduces 
emissions volume further over time. This thinking is deficient on two fronts. First, 
proposed cap-and-trade regimes do not place all emitters in all sectors under the regime. 
Second, the emissions guarantee works only if price is not important because a market 
intervention can either set a price or a quantity, but not both. Unless low-cost abatement 
solutions emerge, which is unlikely without a clean energy innovation policy, the guarantee 
of continuingly falling emissions will only lead to continually growing prices. If carbon 
were priced at some extremely high level, then needed GHG reductions would be possible. 
But the political support for cap and trade under that scenario would evaporate, as 
suggested by the failure of cap and trade legislation in the Senate.  
The problem with the majority of the neo-Keynesian subsidies is that they are intended to 
make existing technologies cost competitive with carbon-based energy. They are not based 
on a clean energy innovation strategy where subsidies are strategically targeted to support 
the development clean energy sources that are cheaper than existing carbon based energy 
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sources. Too often subsidies go to existing, but commercially premature and unviable 
“transition” technologies without a structured plan for long-term benefit. The consequence 
is that when the subsidies run out, the product is not cost competitive (as with the case of 
corn ethanol) and the supported industry asks for more. It is important not only to 
determine if these investments provide the next generation, zero-carbon solutions, but also 
to question whether the infrastructure needed to support successful commercialization and 
market absorption exists or needs support. Infrastructure bottlenecks reduce the potential 
of any clean technology option.  
Neo-Keynesians subsidies focus more on the short term. Yet, focusing on “low hanging 
fruit” will mostly result in what innovation economics-focused William Bonvillian and 
Charles Weiss refer to as incremental innovations in conservation and end-use efficiency.88 
These innovations are often small improvements that are unlikely to produce clean 
technologies that cost less than coal or oil. However, without a strategy to address the need 
for dramatic clean energy innovations, too many potential solutions could lay fallow. This 
is due to the strong lock-in mechanisms of existing technologies; technological lock-in 
becomes even greater in the “complex, deeply entrenched, heavily subsidized energy 
sector.”89  
Neo-Keynesians don’t really focus on the process of innovation. Their view is if you want 
something in the marketplace, either regulate it or subsidize it so it can compete. Markko 
Hekkert, a chemist and innovation professor at Utrecht University, suggests neo-
Keynesians prefer to view energy technologies “through an ‘environmental lens’ and not 
through an ‘innovation lens’….Meaning that focus was on high reduction of carbon at a 
low cost instead of how energy innovation really affected economic factors 
([unemployment], GDP, growth, exports).”90  
It is not that subsidies, per-se, are a neo-Keynesian strategy; as discussed below, innovation 
economists support subsidies. The issue is the target of subsidies. Subsidies like R&D 
investment or tax credits can be a technology-push strategy; not just a market-pull or 
induced-demand strategy. Figure 1 depicts this dynamic, with Price 1 as the original price 
of the technology and Price 2 including the market-pull subsidy. Without innovation to 
develop the next generation of cost-efficient technologies, subsidies are needed in 
perpetuity to make clean energy competitive with dirty.  
In contrast, an innovation-focused policy that seeks to spur innovation and cost reduction 
helps drive down the costs of cleaner technologies in the long term (Price 3). With better 
and cost-competitive technologies, producers face no costs of compliance, and consumers 
experience a grid-parity alternative to fossil fuels. Such an innovation strategy will also lend 
itself to technological breakthroughs because it recognizes that innovation is a long process, 
with no certain time horizon, and is reliant on learning by doing. Breakthrough 
innovations are necessary to address climate change, and, as innovation economist Jan 
Fagerberg states, these “typically open up opportunities for a whole range of new 
innovations (without which such breakthroughs may in fact be of little economic 
significance).”91 Neo-Keynesians don’t think about the double role that subsidies can play 
as part of a strategy. They concentrate on the first and mostly modest market pull and 
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ignore the second critical funding for targeted and effective investments to spur emerging 
technologies to scale and drive the cost curve down. 
Likewise, the neo-Keynesian’s performance-standards approach fails to drive innovation in 
any meaningful way, allowing existing, inferior technologies to win the part of the market 
that must meet the standards. In addition, according to Resources for the Future 
economists Parry and Pizer, “performance standards typically do not impose an economy 
wide carbon price and therefore fail to meet these conditions for efficiently distributing the 
burden of emission reductions across different firms, households, and mitigation 
options….[They] have a weaker impact on conservation than market-based instruments 
because, while lowering emissions per unit of output or use, they do not raise the cost of 
output or use to reflect resulting emissions.”92 The movement of current energy policy 
away from cap-and-trade to performance standards is falling into an inflexible, ineffective, 
non-innovative neo-Keynesian trap. 
Innovation Economics on Climate Change: Carbon Tax & Clean Energy Innovation 
The dominance of the neoclassical and neo-Keynesian economic doctrines in the climate 
change debate leads many policy makers to assume that the only options are setting a price 
on carbon through a tax or cap, regulating energy consumption, and/or subsidizing existing 
renewable energy sources. These doctrines offer restricted views of the policy problem and 
condone government intervention only for the sake of correcting an externality or ensuring 
equitable outcomes. Each doctrine’s primary policy solution fails to recognize that 
addressing climate change entails correcting a significant array of market failures, including 
information asymmetries, risk, and uncertainty. 
In addition, climate policy must confront a deeply entrenched, fossil-fuel-dependent, 
energy sector in which energy sources tend to dominate markets over long cycles. For 
example, coal usage started in the 1860s, but it was not fully integrated into the market 
until 1910; and while oil emerged as a potential energy source around World War I, 
widespread oil dependence didn’t arise until the 1940s. Clean energy will face a similarly 
long path in gaining mass-market penetration unless we implement a comprehensive clean 
energy innovation strategy. 
As explained above, the neoclassical response is to remove market imperfections or 
distortions while innovation economics embraces many of these imperfections as important 
sources of endogenous technological change and growth in a dynamic economy. 
Consequently, innovation economics policies seek to encourage certain neoclassical 
“impediments.” Innovation economics recognizes the complexity of the sources of growth 
and the many institutions that confront companies seeking to develop clean energy 
innovations. Facilitating such innovative actions, improving productive and adaptive 
efficiency, and supporting a clean energy innovation system require a variety of policy tools 
to grow the economy in a strategic zero-carbon direction.  
Innovation economics appreciates that the market is an efficient tool to drive change and 
that government should correct market failures impeding clean energy innovation. Like the 
neoclassicalists, holders of the innovation economics doctrine agree that getting price 
signals right, ideally through a carbon tax, is a necessary foundation. Clean energy 
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technologies will always cost more initially, and without new functionality, consumers will 
not pay a premium for them. Thus, a price on carbon is essential to commercialization of 
new energy technology; however, a clean energy innovation policy is also a prerequisite 
because just letting markets work is not enough. Like neo-Keynesians, innovation 
economists agree that a proactive role for government is needed. But that role needs to be 
focused on creating a more robust clean energy innovation system, not simply mandating 
or subsidizing existing energy alternatives. In short, global climate change can’t be solved 
without an energy revolution and that will not occur without a coherent and cohesive 
innovation system policy that spurs next-generation clean energy technologies to the point 
that they are cost competitive with fossil fuels. Neither price nor regulation alone can 
accomplish this goal while growing a productive, competitive U.S. economy.  
In addressing the constraints of the dominant doctrines, innovation economics offers an 
alternative for climate change policy. Proponents include academics and economists like 
Daron Acemoglu, Phillipe Aghion, David Hemous, Reinhilde Veugelers, Paul Romer, 
Douglass North, F.M. Scherer, Paul David, and Dominique Foray, Lester Thurow, 
William Bonvillian, Charles Weiss, John Alic, and Richard Newell; and organizations and 
think tanks like the Brookings Institution, Breakthrough Institute, Clean Energy Group, 
Meridian Institute, and Third Way. 93 Moving to a low-carbon energy future will not be 
easy; however, innovation economics provides the correct frame to address climate change. 
The doctrine is concerned with dynamic processes of how markets develop and how 
organizations in markets innovate. Innovation is the means by which all types of economic 
actors can overcome limiting conditions, like the current reliance of fossil fuels and 
business-as-usual GHG emissions. 94  As innovation economists Thomas Grebel, Andreas 
Pyka, and Horst Hanusch clarify, “Innovation competition takes the place of price 
competition as the coordinating mechanism of interest.”95 Consequently, creating the 
environment for radical clean energy innovation will more directly confront the limiting 
conditions in current energy markets.96 
To develop a coherent and cohesive innovation system policy that spurs next-generation 
clean energy technologies, it is essential to understand that innovation is not just science. 
The neoclassical doctrine recognizes that private markets don’t naturally produce science 
and its accompanied R&D well; the deficiency in supply of this “public good” became an 
acceptable reason for public subsidization of scientific research. However, science isn’t 
innovation. As innovation economist Jan Fagerberg states: 
Science is about expanding knowledge, not necessarily with a practical purpose in 
mind. Innovation is about combining different types of knowledge (not necessarily 
novel), skills and resources to solve practical problems and try the solutions thus 
obtained out in practice (usually with a view to commercial application). Science is 
mainly practiced in universities or other publicly supported research institutions 
whilst innovation is largely performed by private firms.97  
Due to the differences between science and innovation, supporting the process of 
innovation and building an innovation system requires more than correcting a public-good 
market failure in the supply of science, as the neoclassical approach condones. Policies to 
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create and nurture successful innovation systems recognize the different actors, forms of 
organizations, and incentive structures necessary to seed innovation, as well as the complex 
interdependencies across systems. In fact, even Fagergberg’s allusion to the barrier among 
firms and universities is limited. Innovation systems are likely to rely on a hybrid model 
among university teams, startups, and smaller firms, much like Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) utilized and Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA-E) in 
the Department of Energy is currently funding.98 
Given the range of challenges innovators face, clean energy innovation requires an 
innovation strategy. Beyond the “science as a public good” concept, markets for clean 
energy innovation are ripe with knowledge externalities. Although knowledge externalities 
are necessary to advance technology development, an inventor cannot completely accrue 
the benefits of information and knowledge surrounding the innovation and invention. 
Other “free riders” can use the information and benefit from utilizing it in their own 
offerings. Although publicly-created patent systems attempt to decrease the diffusion of 
benefits to others, the patenting process can be expensive and slow and still does not 
completely address knowledge spillovers. Thus, strategic government investment in clean 
energy innovation must address the externality. Although generalized support for research 
is important, it’s not enough. Currently, U.S. policy fails to address in a cohesive and 
coherent manner even the conventional neoclassical failures in the clean energy innovation 
process.  
Innovation economics delves further and suggests that the current climate policy proposals 
fail to address the presence of information asymmetries and uncertainty in the innovation 
process. Information is usually incomplete, and although the response of innovators can be 
rational, they are bounded by what is known and how what they know is related to other 
pieces of information. Consequently, limited information and bounded rationality affect 
investment decisions due to the uncertainty of an innovation’s future success—the impact 
may be too risky to garner anticipated returns. In clean energy, scientists, researchers, and 
would-be entrepreneurs are unsure that the United States  will address climate change in 
any way that will increase provider and consumer demand for better clean technologies 
than already exist today. Instead of working toward the next generation, their efforts offer 
incremental improvements of the market’s current offerings. A cohesive climate innovation 
policy must address these limits to develop the next generation of clean energy. 
In cases where government does support clean R&D, it shies away from picking winners 
due to neoclassical guidance. Unfortunately, this also ignores a basic tenet of an innovation 
strategy. As Hekkert suggests, “new sustainable technologies tend to be more expensive and 
have lower performance measured along some dimensions than existing technologies.”99 
The guiding rationale for innovation economists is that only with a commitment to clean-
technology cost competitiveness will long-term gains be enough to address climate change. 
Supporting these winners is part of this process and will lead the United States beyond 
incremental improvements to existing technologies. A partial commitment to an 
innovation strategy came with the establishment of ARPA-E in 2009, which awards monies 
in transformational R&D, and the Department of Energy’s 46 Energy Frontier Research 
An innovation-focused 
policy that seeks to spur 
innovation and cost 
reduction helps drive 
down the costs of cleaner 
technologies in the long 
term. 
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Centers (EFRCs), which involve universities, national laboratories, nonprofit organizations, 
and for-profit firms in basic- and advanced-discovery energy research.  
Innovation economics also provides reasoning for why and how conventional government 
support should go beyond correcting market failures, and in due course commit to clean 
technology cost competitiveness. According to innovation economist Allan Gjerding, in 
place of prices, the “market must be endowed with inter-organizational arrangements in 
order to achieve coordinative efficiency in cases where there is not complete knowledge 
about the characteristics of new products and processes.”100 The doctrine recognizes that 
“what matters most for successful innovation is not so much the link with basic science, big 
public laboratories or universities, or IPRs [intellectual property rights] for that sake, but 
close interaction with users (demand), suppliers and competitors.”101  
Thus, the development and support of these inter-organizational arrangements or 
“networks” that encompass these interactions are essential to the clean energy innovation 
process. Economist John Barber explains that firms “gain various kinds of technology, 
knowledge, information, market access and other resources” from interactions in networks 
of “suppliers, customers, competitors, universities, research institutes, investment banks, 
government departments.”102 The sharing of information within and across networks 
depicts the complexity of innovation, and how coordination among network actors can 
increase productive and adaptive efficiency, which in turn can result in improved basic 
routines and the development of clean energy breakthroughs.  
For example, government-supported clean energy innovation should facilitate networks 
and collaboration with incentives built into federally-funded research grants to universities 
and federal labs. Government contract managers making federal research fund awards 
should know what intellectual property is being developed and has potential; moreover, a 
process should be in place to increase communication, collaboration, and coordination 
among all technology transfer institutions. Moving ideas, people, money, facilities and 
equipment seamlessly among the collaborators (government, university, industry, NGO, 
foundation, etc.) is essential in a global, knowledge-based economy. Creating these 
partnerships would also go a long way toward facilitating commercialization through the 
development of a cluster of essential actors like research and business partners as well as 
specific expertise in economic development, financing, and regulation. These new networks 
will provide a foundation for a clean energy innovation system.  
Several initiatives and proposals provide examples of building networks and driving 
collaborative clean energy commercialization: the Department of Energy’s three energy 
innovation hubs consisting of large, collaborative teams of scientists and engineers that 
work together to pursue transformative clean-technology breakthroughs; the first 
interagency Energy Regional Innovation Cluster (E-RIC) focused on Energy Efficient 
Building Systems; and Brookings Institution’s proposed energy discovery-innovation 
institutes, which would be a national network of regionally-based, energy discovery-
innovation institutes (e-DIIs) to serve as hubs of a distributed research network linking the 
nation’s best scientists, engineers, and facilities. 103 104 105 
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A supportive clean energy innovation environment and resulting networks must also 
address specific characteristics of the energy sector, from its size and regulated nature to its 
lack of innovation and investment. Although the United States invented many of the clean 
energy technologies in wide application today, including nuclear, wind, and solar power, 
current private-sector energy R&D spending and innovation is miniscule.106 It accounts for 
less than one half of one percent of industry revenues, which is only one tenth of the 
nationwide industry average and two orders of magnitude less than innovation-intensive 
industries like IT or biomedical technology.107 Hekkert suggests that “[D]ue to the strongly 
regulated character of the energy sector, normal market dynamics do seldom take place. 
Incumbent companies have a large influence in the political debates and decisions 
regarding any change in the energy sector. Smaller entrepreneurial firms hardly have any 
lobby power that is necessary to create favorable conditions for their innovations. The 
success rate of these firms is therefore much smaller than under normal market 
conditions.”108 Any clean energy innovation strategy must support and enable clean 
technology entrepreneurs and markets to be more adaptive and overcome these challenges 
and conditions. 
Although nurturing and management of the process of clean energy innovation is essential, 
innovation economics does not ignore the importance of pricing carbon in addressing 
climate change. The market is an essential complement to the design of a government-
supported innovation strategy; however, the complexity of the climate change challenge 
requires a multiple policy tools approach. Pricing carbon is part and parcel to addressing 
the environmental externality and can also help provide revenues to support clean energy 
research, development and deployment.109 But supportive innovation strategy cannot stop 
there. Tufts University environmental scientists William Moomaw and Judy Layzer 
recognize this in their support for carbon taxes and for dismantling “the web of policies 
that overwhelmingly favors fossil-fuel production and use and actively discriminates against 
new technologies and practices that would reduce harmful emissions….Similarly, policies 
that protect large, obsolete coal-burning power plants in the United States obstruct efforts 
to make a transition to newer, more efficient power sources, including renewables and 
distributed, combined heat and power systems.”110  
Innovation economics stresses that other tools must complement carbon pricing to 
establish an innovative clean energy system. Pricing carbon in combination with a clean 
energy innovation strategy promotes a long-term solution that spurs innovation, drives cost 
curves of clean technology downward (see Price 3 in Figure 2 above), and makes clean 
energy cost competitive with fossil fuels, without long-term subsidization.  
Current research also supports this framework. Recent findings from innovation-minded 
economists suggest that optimal environmental regulation includes a carbon tax to control 
current emissions as well as research subsidies to influence the direction of research.111 
Acemoglu and coauthors state that an optimal policy relies “less on tax and more on direct 
encouragement of development of clean technologies.”112 Yale University economist David 
Popp proposes that market-based policies must focus on the long term because in the short 
term the cheaper and close-to-market alternatives will dominate. Consequently, long-term 
policy must direct basic R&D with investment tax credits and technology mandates, as 
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well as recognize how R&D should also focus on commercialization and not just 
development.113 A clean energy innovation strategy would adopt the long view and provide 
support throughout the innovation life cycle. Most technology transfer managers in 
universities and national labs claim that technology development gap funding for proof of 
principle or concept is both economical and essential to technology maturation, yet less 
than two percent of programs provide such proof-of-concept or principle support. A 
potential policy tool of a government clean energy innovation strategy would designate a 
certain percentage of all federally-funded research for technology development gap funding, 
diminishing some development barriers. 
Carolyn Fischer and Richard Newell also suggest that long-term R&D strategies are 
essential to addressing climate change outcomes. They compare R&D subsidies for existing 
renewable energies to other climate policies (carbon pricing, mandates, performance 
standards, etc.) in terms of meeting climate goals, such as reducing emissions and reducing 
energy consumption. They find that subsidies for existing renewables performed much 
worse than other approaches; however, they acknowledge that this was because the 
subsidies prompted only incremental change in existing renewable technologies. The 
authors suggest that the outcome was a result of the “focus on reductions over the near-to-
mid-term and incremental improvement of existing technology, rather than breakthrough 
technologies that might achieve deep reductions. It seems likely that R&D policies have 
greater salience in the latter context...”114 They also conclude that multiple policies are 
important to meet climate goals; “We show that an emissions price alone, although the 
least costly of the single policy levers, is significantly more expensive alone than when used 
in combination with optimal knowledge subsidy policies.”115  
Aghion and his coauthors find similar cost savings.116 An innovation strategy addressing 
price and innovation with its multiple market failures offers a dynamic approach that is 
also less costly in the long term due to investments that will drive the cost curves of 
producing zero-carbon energy to grid parity with fossil fuels. As part of the stimulus 
package, ARRA authorized the Section 48c clean technology production tax credits, 
discussed above. The Section 48c clean technology production tax credits offer an example 
of a coordinated government effort to spur private-sector innovation in clean energy 
manufacturing. The government should not only extend the program, but also modify it to 
make it a driver of clean energy innovation.117 For example, it should include a criteria to 
reward projects that are likely to lead to greater exports and more breakthrough innovation 
A government-supported clean energy innovation strategy would also seek to leverage other 
mechanisms like procurement to pull and push clean energy innovation. Several innovation 
economics thinkers recently proposed that the Department of Defense (DOD) do so. 
DOD is a major customer for energy-consuming systems and equipment, with its 
approximately 500 permanent installations and expenditure of $10 billion a year on liquid 
fuels. In addition, the R&D capacity of DOD is tremendous—30,000 engineers and 
scientists in R&D and procurement, an annual R&D budget of $80 billion, and over $100 
billion spent on procurement. John Alic, Daniel Sarewitz, Charles Weiss, and William 
Bonvillian suggest that “the DOD thus has the incentives and capacity to be a smart and 
demanding customer for new energy technologies, as well as a test bed for new ideas such 
Currently, U.S. policy 
fails to address in a 
cohesive and coherent 
manner even the 
conventional neoclassical 
failures in the clean 
energy innovation process. 
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as high-energy-density electrical storage.”118 DOD procurement could induce demand, 
decreasing the uncertainties and knowledge spillovers that entrepreneurs face, and spur 
innovation in clean energy technology, creating a bridge to the critical next generation. In 
addition, procurement can also help leverage other government clean energy investments. 
For example, the ARRA’s $1.5 billion investment in advanced battery manufacturing and 
production should result in 640,000 advanced batteries on the market in 2015.119 If DOD 
would look to utilize this production, it could encourage competition and risk taking, as 
well as ensure appropriate safety requirements. 
Innovation economics proposes that the failures of “command and control” policies, 
carbon taxes, and cap-and-trade systems emerge because the mandates and price 
mechanisms ignore the importance of creating a new foundation for innovation 
competition. Climate change is more than the lack of full pricing of fossil fuels, which is 
addressable with a carbon tax. An innovation economics framework focuses on the 
importance of subsequent action—spurring clean energy innovation that is cost 
competitive globally. Innovation economics recognizes that the private sector’s full price of 
investing in innovations is not recoverable in any market exchange because it spills over to 
other producers and users who do not invest. The existence of these free-riders decreases 
the incentive to invest in R&D that would generate viable alternatives to reduce GHG, 
such as fully electric cars, affordable solar cells, and large-scale electricity storage devices. 
Thus, without directed government support, incremental technologies will be the only 
option. Innovation economists view a suite of policy tools as essential to confronting 
climate change and guiding the economy in a clean energy direction; carbon taxes, 
government support of clean energy R&D, and the creation of supporting institutions and 
networks are all critical in creating innovation competition and driving clean energy on a 
global scale. 
CONCLUSION 
In the 21st century’s global economy, innovation and knowledge are the most important 
factors not only in driving economic growth, but in addressing climate change. U.S. 
policymakers need to recognize that sole reliance on neo-Keynesian regulation and 
subsidies or the conservative and liberal neoclassical carbon taxes and cap-and-trade regimes 
will not only fail to significantly decrease GHG emissions, but also fail to produce the 
kinds of needed low-cost clean energy technologies that can be adopted globally—
particularly in the absence of regulation, carbon taxes, or subsidies in other nations. These 
approaches give short shrift to the importance of government policy creating an innovative 
foundation for clean energy technologies.  
Lord Stern offers perspective on a limited, “business as usual” action:  
If the economy stops growing now and we continue with existing technologies, the 
current level of annual global emissions of close to 50 billion metric tons of 
carbon-dioxide-equivalent would imply atmospheric concentrations of close to 700 
parts per million within a century, and entail huge risks….Those who say that 
low-carbon growth is too costly, and that we can continue with high-carbon 
growth, make the same mistake. They embrace a view embodying ‘limited 
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substitutability’ and ‘restricted scope for investment in changing technologies’: 
they embrace the growth theories of the mid-twentieth century.120 
Recently, Nordhaus and Shellenberger noted that a climate-technology consensus has 
emerged among academics like Steve Rayner, Gwyn Prins, Mike Hulme; organizations like 
Policy Exchange, and Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), and even the American 
Enterprise Institute; and private sector leaders like Bill Gates and executives from Xerox 
and General Electric as founders of the American Energy Innovation Council.121 This 
consensus reinforces the need for direct investments to overcome the technology gap and 
make clean energy much cheaper. Moving forward on an effective climate change strategy 
requires that an energy innovation strategy grounded in the right economic doctrine: 
innovation economics.  
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